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Abstract 
In early 2016, China introduced additional capacity cut policies to rebalance supply in the coal 
market to match demand that had been reduced by slow economic growth and strict 
environmental regulation. Ensuing disruptions to the coal market caused these policies to be 
revised and, subsequently, discarded as decision makers tried to find a balance between efficient 
supply, economic and social stability and environmental sustainability. This paper explores the 
causes of these unintended consequences using an extended version of the KEM-China model. 
The results reveal that full and partial compliance with the capacity cut policies result in a 
significant gap between supply and demand. This suggests that implementation of the policy was 
technically infeasible, even allowing for a significant increase in coal prices and economic costs. 
Besides, significant differences in coal prices and output profiles are registered across the 
country. We argue that the heterogeneous nature of the Chinese coal market and policy 
compliance was a major factor leading to the unintended consequences. We propose that the 
capacity cut policy should be differentiated across regions and even types of coalmines, market 
approaches would be preferable to the command-and-control instruments, and policy distortions 
that cause excess capacity should be removed. 
Key Words: China; coal; excess capacity; over capacity; capacity cut; KAPSARC Energy Model 
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Economic expansion, industrial policies and generous subsidies led to substantial overcapacity in 
various sectors of China’s economy, including coal industry, which poses significant problems 
under the ‘new normal growth model’ (Hao et al., 2015). In the short run, it puts significant 
pressure on coal prices and, hence, profitability of domestic producers, their ability to service 
their debt and pay their employees on time. In the long-run, a bigger share of coal consumption 
would contravene China’s energy development and environmental targets, as well as its 
international commitment to peak CO2 emissions by 2030.  As the most carbon intensive energy 
source, coal will also be affected by the national emission trading scheme (ETS). Substitution of 
coal with lower emission energy sources is also the key measure to combat air pollution issues in 
China. These environmental policies can add constraints on coal demand and further justify the 
need for capacity cuts to balance the market in the future. Therefore, policies to tackle 
overcapacity issues have been gradually escalated in the past few years (State Council, 2010, 
2013, 2016) but the implementation has not been linear.    
One of the additional coal capacity cut policies, the working day limit (State Council, 2016), 
went through all major phases of its life cycle in 2016, from design to enforcement, revision and 
eventually, retirement. The objective of this policy was to address the detrimental effects of the 
overcapacity on the coal market since the Chinese government believed that the issue would not 
be sufficiently resolved by market forces alone (Shepherd, August 19, 2016). However, major 
disruptions to the coal market caused by the capacity cut initiative demonstrated the difficulty of 
balancing competing priorities in a complex system of economic, social and environmental goals 




































































The unintended consequences arising from this policy initiative present an opportunity for a 
compelling case study in the domains of China’s energy policy, public policy and governance in 
general. In this specific case, contradictory mandates, strong support of mining operations by 
local authorities to protect jobs, and complaints of high coal prices, caused decision makers to 
think again. As observed in 2016, the collision between policies and market dynamics led to an 
upwards shock in coal prices, undermining the elimination of inefficient production capacity. 
Since the Chinese coal industry accounts for a half of global production and consumption, 
studying China’s overcapacity issue is significant for the global community. Due to strong 
economic growth, China’s energy demand has increased consistently since the 1980s and 
experienced a surge in the 2000s. Consequently, China’s share of global coal consumption rose 
from about 30 percent in the early 2000s to 50.5 percent in 2015 (BP, 2016), and accounts for 
around 15-25 percent of global imports (ITC, 2017). Variability in China’s coal production is 
likely to have great impact on the world coal market.  More generally, the  excess capacity 
indicates that other producing countries are unlikely to gain additional market share in the 
Chinese market (Huw McKay and Song, 2010). 
To our knowledge, no study has explored the 2016 coal capacity cut polices and its repercussions 
and there is no quantitative assessment of the impact of any overcapacity issue in China. A 
number of studies have examined China’s overcapacity issues in various sectors including coal, 
heavy chemical, refinery, steel and power generation in the past two year, but none of them 
addresses this important case study. There are primarily focused on the outlook for the power 
generation capacity (Yuan et al., 2016); overall review of the overcapacity situation of China’s 
thermal power industry (Zeng et al., 2017);  measurements for over-capacity of refining 




































































heavy chemical industry (Li et al., 2017);  the measurements or reasons of overcapacity in the 
coal industry (Zhang et al., 2016; Zhang et al., 2017).   
The paper examines why the capacity cut policies and remedial policy interventions in 2016 did 
not have the intended effect, how the coal market responded to these interventions and what 
lessons can be learned more generally about the transition from planned/mandated to 
competitive/liberalized markets. It intends to make contributions to several strands of research by: 
1) Studying an important policy experiment and drawing conclusions that can inform 
international policy makers; 2) Identifying the unintended consequences of the policy, which 
may support calibration of future capacity control policies in coal and other industries; 3) 
Revealing the impact of regional and compliance heterogeneity due to information asymmetry - 
using the KAPSARC Energy Model of China (KEM-China); and 4) Deepening the 
understanding of energy policy and governance in China.  
The paper proceeds as follows: The next section introduces the issues and the hypotheses. 
Section 3 briefly describes the model and extensions added for the purpose of this study. Section 
4 presents the model results and analysis. Regional heterogeneity, information asymmetry due to 
a lack of reliable statistics, implementation problems and heterogeneous agent behaviour are 
explored in this section. Section 5 concludes the paper and summarizes the key policy 
implications. 
2. Background and hypotheses 
2.1. Excess capacity and its causes 
The issue of excess capacity has been explored for several decades in the literature. It has been 




































































cycles (Stiglitz, 1999). It can also occur under monopoly conditions as a deterrent to prevent 
potential entrance of competitors (Barzel, 1970). Chamberlin (1938) found that excess capacity 
is a common phenomenon in a monopolistic market. Excess capacity has also been revealed in 
market economies and less concentrated industries, such as European car manufacturing (Jullien, 
2015). 
However, the main reasons for excess capacity in China are different from those observed in 
market economies. These include government distortions, such as inappropriate industrial 
policies and a vast array of subsidies (Anderlini, 16 June 2013). Haley and Haley (2013) find that 
subsidies, in a broad sense, including cheap land and credit, discounted utilities and tax breaks, 
account for about 30 percent of industrial output and represent the major driving factor for 
excess capacity. The overcapacity problem has become prominent in recent years due to over 
reaction by the Chinese government to the global financial crisis. This has been shown to drive 
down profits and even threaten the growth dynamics, with recent efforts to slow down demand 
further exacerbating the problem (Anderlini, 16 June 2013). Local government support is another 
important driver of overcapacity. Local government tends to distort mines’ economic behaviour 
to increase their popularity by increasing jobs, GDP and deferring bankruptcy (Shi, 2009).  The 
overcapacity of Chinese industries also causes significant problems outside China, as it produces 
nearly half of the world’s coal, aluminium and steel, and about 60 percent of global cement.  
Despite significant progress in liberalizing the Chinese economy in general, and the coal industry 
in particular (Shi, 2009), the government often resorts to policy interventions as a means of 
sectoral regulation (Shi, 2013). The coal capacity cutis a recent intervention by the Chinese 




































































The objectives of the policies have changed over time, as have the instruments used. Initially, 
elimination of excessive and less efficient capacity was regarded as a step towards achieving 
strategic goals of transforming economic development, adjusting economic structure and 
promoting energy conservation and emission reduction (State Council 2010). In 2010, the State 
Council strengthened the elimination of backward production capacities and issued specific 
targets for more than ten key industries, including coal (State Council, 2010). As the issues 
surrounding overcapacity became more serious , the focus shifted to specific problems and their 
consequences. The Guiding Opinions issued by the State Council in 2013 and 2016 emphasized 
the need to rectify misallocation of resources in order to prevent industry losses, non-performing 
loans, safety problems, unemployment and environmental degradation (State Council 2013, 
2016). In 2013, the capacity cut policy was institutionalized through supply-side reforms 
(‘Gonggeice Gaige’) (Acheson et al., 2015; State Council, 2013). 
Nowadays relveant policy documents stressthe importance of market mechanisms (supported by 
administrative measures) in resolving the overcapacity issue, as it extends its detrimental effect 
on the coal market. However, China’s policymakers grew distrustful of the ability of the market 
to resolve this issue. Lian Weilang, the deputy minister of National Development and Reform 
Commission (NDRC), argued that government intervention was needed to avoid “bad money 
driving out good money” (Shepherd, August 19, 2016).  
Indeed, the market has been not effective enough in driving out inefficient or failed companies, 
often referred to as ‘zombie enterprises’. They rely on ‘life support’ received from a combination 
of local governments (reliant on these enterprises for economic growth, taxation and 
employment indicators) and banks (not wanting to write off or make provisions for bad debts) 




































































driven by both economic efficiency, to protect the interest of investors, and by imposed social 
obligations. This makes divestment, scaling down operatoins or closure less likely (Hao et al., 
2015).  Moreover, the regulatory uncertainty can prevent the firms from exting a market if they 
expect government intervention tosend prices back up. 
However, past experience suggests that despite being initiated in good faith, such interventions 
often lead to outcomes that diverge from original intentions causing significant economic loss 
and damaging the credibility of the government (Andrews-Speed, 2004; Andrews-Speed et al., 
2003; Shen and Andrews-Speed, 2001; Shen et al., 2009; Shi, 2013). The track record of past 
policy interventions in China’s coal industry suggests that there are significant challenges in the 
choice of policy tools, enforcement mechanisms, estimation of policy outcomes and balancing 
economic, social and environmental needs (Andrews-Speed, 2004; Shi, 2009; Yuan et al., 2016; 
Zhang et al., 2017). 
2.2. Evolution of the 2016 capacity cut policies 
At the start of 2016,  the Chinese coal industry was in a critical stage. China’s coal prices 
plummeted from May 2013 until the end of 2015 (see Figure 1). According to a survey  
(sxcoal.com, 2017a), only 10 out of 265 sampled mines in Shanxi, Shaanxi and Inner Mongolia, 
the three key coal producing provinces, were able to make a profit from supplying coal to Bohai-
rim ports in January 2016. More than 35 percent of coal mining enterprises recorded losses in the 
first quarter of 2016 (CEIC, 2017). The economic distress in the coal industry also had a negative 
impact on the socio-economic stability in key mining regions. The well below national average 
GDP growth of 3.1 percent recorded in Shanxi province in 2015 fell to a quarter of its 2011 level, 
when coal prices were peaking. The number of workers in coal mining dropped by 10 percent in 




































































The immediate economic and social consequences urged Chinese policymakers to intervene, 
with the hope to boost coal prices to desirable levels. In February 2016, the State Council issued 
the policy stating that China will cut up to 1000 million tons (MMt) of coal production capacity 
in the next 3-5 years starting from 2016 and ordered all coal producers to reduce the number of 
annual working days from 330 to 276 (State Council, 2016). This working day limit effectively 
reduced coal production capacity by an additional 16 percent. Subsequently, the capacity 
reduction target for 2016 was set at 250 MMt and was reportedly achieved later in the year 
(Xinhua, 24 Nov 2016).  
These capacity cut measures reversed the trend in the Bohai-rim port coal price (see Figure 1), 
which was used as a gauge by policymakers. The coal prices rebounded in February 2016 and 
skyrocketed in July 2016, which, was not expected by the government.  
To stablize coal prices the NDRC implemented a three grade response mechanisms for thermal 
coal using the national FOB Bohai rim benchmark port price (incl. VAT): Grade 3: Above 460 
yuan/t – 53 mines in Coal Country (Shanxi, Shaanxi, Ningxia and Inner Mongolia provinces) 
increase output by 0.2 MMt/day. Grade 2: Above 480 yuan/t – 66 mines in Coal Country, 
Shandong, Henan, Anhui and Jiangsu increase output by 0.3 MMt/day. Response called off 
below 470 yuan/t. Grade 1: Above 500 yuan/t – 74 advanced mines nationally increase output by 
0.5 MMt/day. Response called off below 490 yuan/t (Zhang, 24 Oct 2016). 
 
Figure 1  Daily coal price 25/1/2013-25/5/2017, Qinghuangdao port, 5500 kcal/kg 





































































However, as shown in Figure 1, the mechanism failed to stabilize soaring coal prices as all the 
benchmarks were exceeded in a short time period, leaving no time for the government to respond. 
The capacity cut policy experienced a reluctant U-turn in September 2016, when the NDRC 
gradually softened its standpoint amid a surge in coal prices and concerns over peak winter 
demand. Having exhausted its policy options, at the end of October 2016, the NDRC suspended 
the 276 annual working-day limits for all coalmines. The annual capacity cut policy was also 
softened by allowing efficient coalmines to increase their capacity.  
In early 2017 the fixed capacity cut target of 250 MMt, announced in 2016, was reduced to 150 
MMt (Platts, 6 Mar 2017). In October 2017, Heilongjiang became the first province that 
officially announced to further reduce its capacity cut target due to increasing supply shortage 
(Li, 26 Oct 2017). Furthermore, the government has taken various policy measures, such as 
approval of new coal mines (Wang, 19 Aug 2017) and legalization of unsanctioned production 
capacity of 400-500 MMt (Wu, 3 July 2017) to add more capacity. Despite achieving 85%  of 
the 2017 capacity cut targets by the end of July with the closing of existing mines (Su, 15 Sep 
2017), the net national capacity is expected to increase by 200 MMt by the end of 2017 (Wang, 
19 Aug 2017).  
2.3. Hypotheses  
Success of the 2016 capacity cut policies would only have been likely if several strong 
assumptions had held true. First, there is full compliance with the capacity cut and working day 
limit policies among different levels of government and different kinds of mines. Second, the 
benchmark price reflects the market fundamentals in all regional and sub-regional markets. Third, 




































































needed to stabilize the desirable price levels. The market response and subsequent U-turn in 
policy suggest that at least some of these assumptions were wrong.  
The history of coalmine policies (Andrews-Speed, 2004; Andrews-Speed et al., 2003; Shen and 
Andrews-Speed, 2001; Shen et al., 2009; Shi, 2009, 2013) suggests that incomplete (or 
inadequate) information on production capacities, consumption patterns and policy 
implementation can be a major impediment to an effective intervention. There is a lack of 
reliable statistics due to varying capacities and motivations across local governments. For 
example, the national competition to reduce energy intensity may encourage local governments 
to under report consumption. ‘Zombie enterprises’ also distort the industry’s cost curve causing 
prices to deviate from true production costs. 
Policy implementation can also vary due to the large size of the country and varying local 
conditions.  While the central government is putting efforts to curtail excess capacity, the local 
governments may have opposite interests that undermine the policy (Andrews-Speed et al., 2005; 
Andrews-Speed et al., 2003). There is a consensus that local governments are accountable for the 
unsanctioned production capacity (Wu, 3 July 2017). Local officials are often keen to spend 
government money to advance industries whose success can further their own careers (Anderlini, 
16 June 2013). Most of the subsidies to industries were provided by local and provincial 
governments (Anderlini, 16 June 2013). Zhang et al. (2017) incorporate coal enterprise and local 
government in a three-stage dynamic game model, and demonstrate that local government is 
accountable for overcapacity in the coal industry. 
In this paper, we test two hypotheses to explain the unintended outcomes of China’s coal 




































































Compliance heterogeneity hypothesis: the heterogeneity in coalmine ownership will cause 
distortions in governance and policy implementation. According to the literature on compliance 
in the coal industry, there is a significant divergence among producers of different ownership 
types. Key State Owned Enterprises (SOEs) are more likely to adhere to the capacity cut policy 
because failing to do so would put the managers’ careers at risk. To certain extent, the TVEs 
(local or small coalmines) will ignore the policy in pursuit of profits from higher production and 
prices. The local state owned coalmines could be assumed to demonstrate compliance levels 
somewhere between the two groups (Andrews-Speed et al., 2005; Andrews-Speed et al., 2003; 
Braithwaite, 1985; Shi, 2009). On the other hand, SOEs tend to have softer budget constraints 
and other advantages (Tian and Estrin, 2007), which can help them expand their production by 
upgrading existing or constructing new mines (Shi, 2010; Shi and Grafton, 2010).  
This data also indicate a gradual compliance with the capacity cut policy up until June 2016. The 
National Bureau of Statistics reported in February 2017 that the total coal production in 2016 
was 3.41 billion tons (bt), a 9 percent year-on-year (yoy) decline. The monthly output (compared 
to the same month of the previous year) declined on average by 10 percent from April to 
November 2016, whereas in June it dropped to a 10-year low of 16.6 percent (NBS, 2017a).  
Regional heterogeneity hypothesis: Chinese coal resources are mainly located in the Northwest 
region, specifically, Shaanxi, Shanxi, Inner Mongolia and Xinjiang, while the major demand 
centers are located in the costal Eastern region (NDRC, 2016). Due to the mismatch in resource 
distribution and consumption, supplemented by the transportation costs and constraints, the 
Chinese coal market can be deemed to be fragmented (Ma and Oxley, 2012; Sheng et al., 2014). 




































































heterogeneity will likely cause regional markets to respond differently to the capacity cut 
policies, including varied regional price shocks and production patterns.  
Data presented in Figure 2 shows dissimilarities in provincial coal production trends in 2016. 
Guizhou, a representative of the Southwest market, did not notably reduce its output but rather 
recorded a production surge in June. Xinjiang, in the northwest, and Shanxi (Major coal 
exporting province) demonstrated a similar production pattern. While Guizhou increased 
production to bridge an increasing gap between supply and demand (sxcoal.com, 2016), the 
surge in Xinjiang’s output resulted from a high relative price increase (see Figure 4) that may 
have pushed the government to relax the policy constraints. In Shanxi, all dominant and large 
local producers, are categorized as ‘advanced capacity’ and allowed to gradually increase 
production according to the national policy response to skyrocketing prices in the second half of 
2016 (Zhang, 24 Oct 2016). On the other hand, during this period Shandong (East China market) 
experienced significant production decline, while the output levels of Heilongjiang (Northeast 
market) and Hunan (Central China market) remained relatively stable. 
 
Figure 2   Monthly coal production in major regional markets, MMt 
Source: CEIC (2017) 
3. Model description and scenario design 
To study the impact of the China’s coal capacity and working day cut we have developed a new 
version of the coal supply module of the KAPSARC Energy Model (KEM) of China. The 
module is constructed as a linear problem, minimizing total supply costs, including annualized 




































































thermal and metallurgical coal. The regions and regional nodes used along with demand are 
listed in Table 1.  
The model provides a detailed representation of existing coal production and transshipment 
infrastructure (rail, truck, river and seaports) in a competitive market structure. It was previously 
used to study rail congestion in China’s coal supply industry (Rioux et al., 2016). Please refer to 
this document for further description of the model equations and calibration. The present version 
has been re-calibrated to replicate the supply conditions in the year 2016, including revised 
regional coal transportation infrastructure to account for new coal port and rail lines completed in 
2015. Figure 3 maps the regions (right), and the production capacities and rail infrastructure 
connecting each node (left).  
 
Figure 3 Model regions (left), aggregate production and rail infrastructure (right).  
Source: Authors’ own work 
 
The impact of capacity cut policies on the coal supply market is simulated in the short run with 
no new investment in production or transportation infrastructure. Coal demand is calibrated to 
the year 2016, using the provincial levels reported in 2015 (NBS, 2016) and applying a demand 
reduction of 4.7 percent as reported by the NDRC (NBS, 2017b). Coal import licenses are 




































































metallurgical coal (coking coal and anthracite), 170 MMt other thermal coal, with average 
import prices set to 561 RMB/ton and 396 RMB/ton, respectively
1
. 
Two modifications were made to the original module to address shortages in coal supply 
encountered when enforcing the 2016 capacity cut policies with capped imports. First, excess 
metallurgical coal supplies can be used to fill a thermal coal supply gap. Second, the fixed coal 
demand assumption was relaxed by allowing for substitution with fuel oil, as otherwise the 
model would not converge due to gaps between production and demand. We calibrate the cost of 
demand substitution as the average price of Heavy Fuel Oil (HFO 180cst) in China in 2016 
(CEIC, 2017). Excluding VAT, the price is estimated at 2092 RMB/ton, or a Standard Coal 
Equivalent (SCE 7000 kcal/kg) of 1431 RMB/ton. 
The regional coal production structure and costs are based on data from the IHS Coal Rush study 
(IHS CERA, 2013) that defines 102 different aggregate suppliers with production broken down 
by mining method, calorific value and coal processing. The production units presented Table A1 
(see Appendix) are categorized by four producer types: State Owned Enterprises (SOE), local 
provincial enterprises, small Town & Village Enterprises (TVE), and All Others. The 2011 
production costs reported in the IHS study are adjusted to the year 2015 using a cost index of 
87.7 percent derived from cost of sales data from the CEIC (2017). The total aggregate 
provincial production capacity in 2015, before capacity cuts were implemented, was estimated at 
4.29 billion tons based on (CEIC, 2017) and KAPSARC analysis. The provincial capacity 
estimates are used to rescale the production structure from the IHS Coal Rush data. 
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Table 1: Model regions and transhipment nodes 
Source: National Bureau of Statistics (2016), KAPSARC Analysis 
The first scenario represents the hypothetical coal market in 2016 if no capacity cuts had been 
implemented the Business As Usual (BAU) case. Next, we simulate the impact of full compliance 
by all producers under the 16 percent working day reduction, assuming a proportional drop in the 
2015 capacity levels, in addition to a fixed capacity reduction of 125 MMt: the New Baseline 
policy scenario. The fixed capacity reduction was calculated from the nominal capacity cut of 
290 MMt (Xinhua, 5 March 2017) multiplied by a 43 percent effectiveness factor sourced from a 
survey of coal enterprises, which, revealed that idle mines and ‘zombie’ enterprises accounted 
for a substantial share of capacity cuts (China Bond Rating, 2016). In order to further analyzing 
the sensitivity of the market response, the working day and fixed capacity cuts are simulated in 
isolation, and under an alternate 2015 demand assumption. The breakdown of the regional and 
aggregate SOE fixed cuts is detailed in the appendix in the Table A2.  
Finally, we simulate three additional policy cases that imply either non-compliance with the 
working day cut, or advanced capacity release, by different producer categories and regions. We 
simulate a scenario with a 100 percent non-compliance by regions with a net import of coal: 
Importers non-compliance. In the next scenario, we simulate the TVE and Local non-compliance 
assuming a 100 and 50 percent non-compliance by the respective producer categories. In the 
SOE (Advanced) Capacity Release scenario, the working day cut is lifted for advanced state 
owned enterprises, representing a response by the government to the observed price spike. The 
scenarios are summarized in Table 2. 
Table 2. Summary of scenarios setting 





































































In this study, the model is solved as a static partial equilibrium in the year 2016. Therefore, it 
does not consider time varying dynamics and impacts beyond production and transportation 
optimization. In practice, policies are implemented gradually over time with induced changes in 
consumption and reactions by market participants. Although the scenarios do not capture all 
effects of the policies, they do highlight key outcomes and ways to improve their design and 
implementation. 
4. Results and discussion 
4.1. Effects of the capacity cuts  
The capacity cut policies applied to the New Baseline scenario have a profound impact on the 
key indicators when compared to the BAU. Total systems costs, average national prices, the 
thermal coal supply gap (filled by either metallurgical coal or fuel oil), total supplies by producer 
category and coal transportation are shown in the Table 3. The price response is primarily driven 
by shifts in the supply curve that result in a significant increase of its slope and the cost of 
marginal production units. Compared to the BAU, average production cost (before transportation) 
increases 27 percent in the New Baseline, while the average production cost of the last 200 MMt 
increases 67 percent. 
 
Table 3.  Effects of the coal capacity cut policy: total costs, average price, production and 
transportation statistics  





































































The combination of the permanent capacity cut and working day restrictions result in a domestic 
thermal coal supply gap of 72 MMt SCE, in addition to 53 MMt SCE of excess metallurgical 
coal supplies used as thermal coal. This result showcases that this policy combination is not 
technically feasible when applied to publicly available capacity data and consumption profiles. 
In reality, this balance can be closed by one, or a combination, of the following factors: 
unreported capacity or production, partial noncompliance with the policy and stock depletion. 
While it is difficult to obtain the data on unreported production or compliance levels, evidence 
suggests that stock withdrawals of thermal coal from January to October 2016 reached 100 MMt 
(sxcoal.com, 2017b).  
Though the coal market, to some extent, alleviated the impact of the capacity control policies, it 
is evident that this policy mix is unsustainable from a supply perspective. Comparison of the 
prices and total costs under the BAU and New Baseline scenarios further confirms this. The 
policy intervention caused the national average coal price to increase 138 percent from the BAU 
level. Note that the reported average price reflects our assumption on the value of fuel used to 
substitute coal demand (1431 RMB/ton SCE). It is not intended to mirror the actual coal prices 
observed in the market, because, actual prices are also affected by a number of factors not 
captured by the model. The scenarios highlight the observed trends and illustrates issues with the 
original design. In Section 4.3 we demonstrate that the price volatility can persist in under the 
non-compliance scenarios, even when eliminating the supply gap filled by fuel oil. 
Concerning the measures proposed by the NDRC (Grade-3, Grade-2 and Grade-1) to stabilize 
the Bohai rim port price, the model output suggests that it would be insufficient. Even the highest 




































































enough to cover the supply deficit and increased marginal cost due to substitution for 
metallurgical coal and heavy fuel oil. 
Finally, the capacity cut policy, if fully implemented, would result in a 12 percent increase of 
total system costs (RMB 138 billion), which include both production and transportation costs. 
The working day cut essentially limits the optimal production level within and across regional 
mines, reducing their aggregate efficiency. It also puts additional strain on the rail transportation 
system increasing the ton-kilometer coal freight by 11 percent. 
4.2. Uncertainties from the permanent capacity cut and demand  
The output of the New Baseline scenario indicates that the combination of the permanent 
capacity cut of 125 MMt and significant working day reduction (~690 MMt of raw production 
capacity) is unsustainable, even under the assumption that demand fell 4.7 percent in 2016. This 
assumption, however, may not entirely represent the reality due to a lack of reliable statistics. In 
this sub-section, we explore the isolated effects of the two capacity cut initiatives and show how 
scenarios are affected by demand fluctuations.  
We introduce two new policy scenarios applying only the 16 percent capacity cut under the 276 
working day policy (IIIa. New Baseline 16% cut) and only the fixed 125 MMt cut (IVa. New 
Baseline 125 MMt cut), summarized in Table 4. A comparison of the scenarios (IIIa vs. IVa) 
demonstrates that the working day reduction is the main driver of the supply gap and associated 
price volatility. The simulations show that the permanent capacity cut initiative, on its own, 
would have had a moderate impact on the market: a 1.4 percent increase in total systems costs 




































































In combination with the fixed capacity cut the permanent cuts causes much more serious shocks. 
This result supports the argument made by Zhang Xiaoqiang, former Deputy Minister of the 
NDRC, that the NDRC policy to simultaneously close down capacity and limit work to 276 days 
is wrong (Zhou, 8 March 2017).
 
The systems costs increase is also much more pronounced in 




Table 4. Comparison of the coal capacity cut policies 
 Source: Modelling results 
 
To assess the impact of the demand assumption, the scenarios in Table 4 are rerun while 
increasing demand by 4.7 percent to the 2015 level. Table 5 shows the impact of the Revised 
demand scenarios on the prices and supply gap. The average price levels under the four baseline 
scenarios (Ib-IVb) demonstrate the acute sensitivity of the coal price to demand fluctuations. The 
average price surge and the total supply gap exceed 110 percent and 190 MMt SCE, respectively, 
under both IIb and IIIb. The prices under the revised demand assumption increase by 35 percent 
for the New Baseline (IIa vs IIb) and 51 percent under the 16 % Cut (IIIa vs IIIb). Considering 
the prevailing underreporting of coal consumption (Buckley, 3 NOV. 3 2015), similar demand 
shocks could have contributed to the unexpected price surge in 2016 and high price level 
observed in 2017.  
 
Table 5. Revised coal policy scenario results under the 2015 (higher) demand assumption  
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Source: Modelling results 
 
4.3. Compliance assessment  
The significant supply gap found in the full compliance scenarios highlights the market 
disruption potential of these policies, providing an explanation for the persistent coal price 
increase in 2016. To address the compliance heterogeneity hypothesis (variations in governance 
and policy compliance), we report results from the three non-compliance scenarios (Importers, 
TVE & Local , SOE Capacity Release) scenarios under the 2016 demand assumption (Table 6). 
 
Table 6. Partial compliance and advanced SOE capacity release scenarios 
Source: Modelling results  
 
Under the three compliance scenarios, significant price increases are still observed, even as the 
supply gap is reduced. They range from 20 percent under the SOE advanced capacity release 
(non-compliance), to 60 percent under the Importers non-compliance scenario. These results 
suggest that the SOE advanced capacity is essential to recover prices. However, the capacity 
release proposed by the NDRC in its three-tier policy response mechanism would result in at best 
a price surge of more than 20 percent and, thus, would not reach its intended goal.  
In both the Importer and TVE & Local non-compliance scenarios, average prices remain high 
under increased production from units with higher costs, and a persistent supply gap. Increased 




































































typically further from major demand nodes. These scenarios suggest that under the conditions 
reported in 2016, even under high non-compliance, a significant price volatility is expected. 
It should be noted that our estimation of price levels could be deemed as conservative due to data 
limitations in representing the coal supply curve. The aggregated supply structure of the model is 
based on a smooth regional supply curve that likely underestimates the marginal cost of 
increased production. Furthermore, the cost curve does not replicate the cost differential of the 
same coalmine at different production levels. 
4.4. Regional heterogeneity  
The regional heterogeneity hypothesis implies that dissimilarities across regions impede 
implementation of the capacity cut policy causing it to deviate from intended outcomes, both at 
the regional and national levels. In Figure 4 we illustrate the impact of the Importers non-
compliance, SOE capacity release, and New Baseline scenarios (Table 2) on the regional price, 
including the percent change compared to the BAU case. Regions are sorted according to the coal 
price levels, decreasing from left to right. 
 
Figure 4 Regional prices and percent difference compared to BAU under various scenarios 
Source: Modelling results 
 
The results confirm the findings in the literature that no single price can reflect national market 
fundamentals (Ma and Oxley, 2012; Sheng et al., 2014). Therefore, using FOB Bohai rim port 
prices as a key indicator in making the capacity cut policy is not always appropriate. For 




































































display the most significant price spikes observed in Henan, West, Coal Country and, most 
notably, – up to a threefold increase – in Xinjiang.  
In general, the regions with the largest difference between coal production and consumption, 
either positive or negative, are most vulnerable to the price shocks triggered by the capacity cut 
policy. The top net coal importing regions (Southwest, Northeast, Central and East) observe the 
highest absolute price levels, while the largest net exporters (e.g. Coal Country, Xinjiang) record 
the largest relative increase in price. The latter phenomenon can be explained by increased 
arbitrage opportunities for domestic producers, who can potentially redirect supplies to the 
provinces with higher prices, increasing the cost of marginal supplies for local consumers. 
Another group of provinces that may be dissatisfied with this policy experience the largest 
percent increase in prices. Those provinces that had high prices will likely be significantly 
impacted by the capacity restriction policies, despite the moderate increase in relative terms. For 
the Importer non-compliance scenario this falls in the 50 percent range for most regions, 
however, several north western regions encounter much higher price shocks. Xinjiang prices 
increases between 65 and 218 percent even under the relaxed SOE capacity release scenario. 
Henan, West, and the Coal Country regions are also an exception exceeding 70 percent in the 
Importers non-compliance scenario. The combination of regional supply heterogeneity with non-
compliance in regions with supply deficits significantly disadvantages industries in regions that 
adhere to the policy.  
Since the provincial and regional governments have the power of enforcing regulations, the 
capacity cut policy in such provinces is unlikely to be fully implemented and complied. For 
example, Guizhou, a part of the Southwest region, had the second highest price in the country 




































































the government to undercut the policy implementation. In December 2016, the Guizhou 
provincial government went even further by subsidizing local coal output and imports from other 
provinces (sxcoal.com, 2016). 
The findings of this study, along with the observed regional mismatch in demand and resource 
distribution, and transportation capacity limit, pose a question—does China have a national coal 
market. This thesis has been discussed in the literature (Ma and Oxley, 2012; Sheng et al., 2014). 
Our finding that there is a lack of national coal market is in in line with the current 13th Five 
Year Plan which specifies four regional markets  (NDRC, 2016). This defies the ‘one fit all’ 
approach to policy interventions, which would likely result in local resistance to such measures, 
even if the national average outcomes turn out to be acceptable. 
5. Conclusion and policy implications 
The life cycle of the Chinese coal capacity cut and working day limit policies in 2016 present an 
interesting case study of how government interventions can fail. These policy measures did not 
address the underlying causes behind misallocation of resources in the coal market and, therefore, 
did not resolve any of the fundamental market inefficiency problems. However, they led to a 
number of unintended consequences including supply shortages, abrupt price spikes and 
distortions in the industry cost curve, thus, increasing the system costs, market volatility and 
regulatory uncertainty. To our knowledge, no existing study has applied a detailed sectoral 
model to investigate why these policies did not have the intended effect or what caused the 
unexpected response in the coal market.  
This study has both academic, industrial and policy implications, within and beyond China’s 




































































prevailing heterogeneity complicate the implementation of policies designed by the central 
government. The two hypotheses, based on information asymmetry, are investigated using the 
extended version of the KEM-China Model. 
The results demonstrate that the policy was technically infeasible: full compliance with the 
proposed measures would cause a significant gap between supply and demand, thereby forcing 
fuel switching to coal’s alternatives. The persistent gap also suggests that the capacity cut and 
subsequent remediate policies were poorly designed. This implies that either production statistics, 
the level of compliance, or both were compromised. The simulations also show that capacity cuts 
result in a significant increase in coal prices and economic costs. 
Our results demonstrate that the government’s intervention through stepwise release of 
‘advanced capacity’ proved to be insufficient to alleviate the price shocks since there is no way 
to calculate a link between supply and price. Linking the policy response mechanisms to the 
national benchmark, the Bohai rim ports price, is inappropriate due to the fragmented nature of 
the coal market and significant variations in regional price patterns. Using the national 
benchmark price as a signal ignores regional heterogeneity issues and does not account for the 
diverse regional interests, which is likely to lead to local enforcement and compliance problems. 
The failure of the capacity cut measures was primarily caused by the inappropriate choice and 
calibration of the policy tools. Moreover, the initial working day limit and subsequent attempts to 
stabilize the coal prices ignore the problem of information asymmetry. The fact that all the three 
price targets were broken in a short amount of time indicates that the targets were poorly set. It is 
not possible to know the exact characteristics of the national supply and demand curve, which is 
hypothetical in nature. The lack of reliable statistics on coal production and demand effectively 




































































We can draw the following policy implications and suggestions from our analysis: 
First, the capacity cut policy should be differentiated across regions due to the fragmented coal 
markets, unbalanced distribution of resources and a mismatch between production and demand 
centres. Given the sheer size of the country, the diversified interests of provincial governments 
and firms with different ownership, nation-wide policy interventions tend to be inefficient and 
costly – if not impossible – to enforce. While it is reasonable to limit the production capacity that 
relies on outdated technologies, the artificial caps on technologically advanced and efficient 
mining units result in a net warfare loss and decline in safety and productivity performance. 
Designing capacity cut targets for specific regions or even producers could help ensure better 
efficiency and feasibility, as demonstrated by the implementation of the permanent capacity cuts 
in 2016. Besides, a detailed plan coordinated with local governments, released in advance and 
implemented gradually, would give the market a better opportunity to adjust and alleviate supply 
and price shocks. However, information availability and compliance enforcement problems 
would still hinder the effectiveness of such a policy. 
Second, market approaches would be preferable to command-and-control instruments. In its 
August 2016 notice (NDRC et al., 2016), the central government agencies encourage local 
governments to establish platforms for capacity quota trading, but so far no specific progress has 
been made. ZHANG Xiaoqiang, the former Deputy Commissioner of NDRC, suggests that 
capacity cuts should be designed and implemented on a mine-by-mine basis (Zhou, 8 March 
2017). This would be cost prohibitive without a market instrument. The coal industry could adapt 
a ‘cap-and-trade’ approach that has proved to be effective in the fishing industry and, more 
recently, in the emission trading schemes in many countries. First proposed by John (1968), the 




































































approach would allow the capacity cut quotas to be redistributed to those mines with the lowest 
compliance costs and thus will reduce enforcement costs. The prices of such permits can be used 
as an indicator of the level of production capacity at the regional and, potentially, national level. 
The market-based approach is recommended for future studies on this topic. 
Other market based strategies to alleviate the supply and price shocks of these and other policy 
interventions may include: development of hedging instruments, relaxing the fixed prices along 
the value chain for more equal price risk distribution and facilitating vertical integration and 
strategic alliances / partnerships between producers and consumers. Demand side market 
instruments targeting consumption would also help alleviate the impact of supply fluctuations.  
Finally, rather than focusing on overcapacity itself, the policies should target the underlying 
factors that distort the behaviour of participants and investors. Potential measures may include: 
strict enforcement of safety, environmental and technological standards, cramping unlicensed 
capacity and illegal operations, limiting amount of debt that companies can assume and reducing 
the level of subsidies and other local government support measures. In parallel, local authorities 
should receive proper incentives and resources to develop welfare and reemployment programs 
in order to alleviate the hardships of the transition period and relieve coal producers from non-
core activities and social burdens. If these hurdles were addressed, the issue of excess capacity – 
a normal phenomenon in business cycles – and its repercussions for the coal industry, its value 
chain and socio-economic development of mining regions, would probably be resolved by the 
market itself. However, these initiatives require addressing a number of complex issues, such as 
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6. Appendix 
Table A1 Production units with supplier type 
Source: IHS CERA (2013), KAPSARC analysis 
 
Table A2 Distribution of fixed regional capacity cuts 
Source: Authors collected capacity cut achievement by provinces from various media sources. 
The data in this table has been multiplied by the 43 percent effectiveness factor from the original 
report data due to the finding that idle mines and ‘zombie’ enterprises accounted for a substantial 
share of capacity cuts (China Bound Rating, 2016). 
 
 
Figure 1  Daily coal price 25/1/2013-25/5/2017, Qinghuangdao port, 5500 kcal/kg 
























Figure 2  Monthly coal production in major regional markets, MMt 




























Heilongj Shandong Hunan 
Guizhou Xinjiang Shanxi (Right) 
Figure(s) 2
  
Figure 1 Model regions (left), aggregate production and rail infrastructure (right).  




Figure 3 Regional prices and percent difference compared to BAU under various 
scenarios 
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Figure(s) 4
Table 1: Model regions and transhipment nodes 








Central Hubei, Hunan, Jiangxi 179 37 Central 
Coal 
Country 
Shanxi, Wester Inner 
Mongolia 
236 65 
Coal Country Central 
North Coal Country Region 
South Coal Country Region 
East 




Eastern Coal Region (Huaibei, Huainan) 
Henan Henan 121 14 Henan 
North Beijing, Hebei, Tianjin 166 41 North 
Northeast 
Heilongjiang, Inner 




Hulunbuir Coal Region 
Tangshan Coal Region 
Xilin Gol Coal Region 
Heilongjiang and Jilin Coal Regions 
Shandong Shandong 203 20 Shandong 
Sichuan Chongqing, Sichuan 89 129 Sichuan 
South Guangdong, Guangxi 147 42 South 
Southwest Guizhou, Yunnan 104 23 
Southwest 
Southwest Coal Region 
West 




Western Coal Region (Ningxia, North 
Shaanxi) 
Xinjiang Xinjiang 56 3 Xinjiang 




Table 2. Summary of scenarios setting 
Scenarios Level of compliance 
(reduction) 
Remarks 
New Baseline 16% reduction   
Importers Importers 0% Non-compliance with working days cut in 
regions with supply deficit 
TVE and Local TVE 0%; Local 8% Non-compliance with working days cut by 
small and local producers 
SOE SOE 0% Advanced capacity release, including SOEs 
and large private companies 
Note: all the policy scenarios include 125 MMt permanent capacity cut. 
Source: Authors’ assumption 
 
Table(s) 2
Table 3.  Effects of the coal capacity cut policy: total costs, average price, production and transportation 
statistics  
 BAU New Baseline 
Total Systems Cost, Billion RMB (% diff BAU) 1,169 1,308 (+12%) 
Average Coal Price, 5000 kcal/kg, RMB (% diff BAU) 419 998 (+138%) 
Thermal Coal Supply Gap 
in MMt SCE 
Metallurgical coal - 53 
Fuel oil/supply gap - 72 
Total Supplies  
after processing, MMt 
TVE 425 357 
Local 701 642 
SOE 1,448 1,465 
Others 613 665 
Transport, billion ton-km Rail  1,419   1,570  
Sea/River 855 823 
Truck 11 - 





Table 4. Comparison of the coal capacity cut policies. 
Scenarios Ia IIa IIIa IVa 





125 MMt cut 
Total Systems Cost,  
Billion RMB 
1,169 1,308 1,258 1,185 
Average Coal Price, 5000 









Supply Gap  
in MMt SCE 
Metallurgical 
coal 
- 53 - - 
Fuel oil - 72 90 - 




Table 5. Revised coal policy scenario results under the 2015 (higher) demand 
assumption  












Average Coal Price, 5000 









Supply Gap  
in MMt SCE 
Metallurgical 
coal 
- 183 117 - 
Fuel oil - 50 73 - 
Source: Modelling results 
 
Table(s) 5
Table 6. Partial compliance and advanced SOE capacity release scenarios.  
 BAU New 
Baseline 





Total Systems Cost,  









Average Coal Price, 5000 kcal/kg, 
RMB (% diff BAU) 









Gap in MMt SCE  
Metallurgical coal - 53 - - - 
Fuel oil - 72 77 12 - 
Total Supplies  
after processing, 
MMt 
TVE 425 357 402 425 357 
Local 701 642 666 695 630 
SOE 1,448 1,465 1,373 1,441 1,657 
Others 613 665 749 656 559 
Transport, billion 
ton-km 
Rail  1,419   1,570   1,454   1,708   1,454  
Sea/River 855 823 888 877 888 
Truck 11 - 14 20 14 





Click here to download Supplementary Material: Table A1.docx
  
Supplementary Material
Click here to download Supplementary Material: Table A2.docx
